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Introduction
The Great Recession that started in 2008 profoundly affected European economies and labor markets. Whereas some of them, mainly in the southern peripheries of the EU, suffered from protracted recessions, others, such as Germany and Slovakia, recovered from a moderate recession swiftly. The Baltic states on the eastern flanks of the EU dipped into rather severe recessions in the early stages of the Great Recession, but managed to revitalize their economies and regain top positions among EU's fastest growing economies relatively quickly. Poland, on the other hand, did not record a recession during this time (see Figure A1 in Appendix).
Whereas fluctuations in economic growth impact the situation in the labor market, labor adjustment affects aggregate GDP dynamics as well. With limited fiscal capacity and no room for monetary adjustment between the member states of the Euro Area, the role of labor mobility as a possible vehicle of adjustment to such asymmetric economic shocks became ever more important (Arpaia et al. 2016) . However, the debates surrounding the UK leaving the EU (Brexit) or the Hungarian anti-refugee referendum of October 2nd, 2016, document, that many EU citizens perceive labor mobility unfavorably. On that background, it is important to inform the mobility debate in Europe with hard analysis and data about immigration's effects on EU member states' labor markets.
Some immigrant groups, such as those originating from the member states that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 (EU-12) tend to be relatively young and well educated (Kahanec, 2013) . As such, they can be expected to adjust to changing economic conditions more flexibly. On the other hand, groups of immigrants from outside the EU may face institutional, regulatory, or socio-economic constraints limiting their adjustment potential. According to Dustmann, Glitz and Vogel (2010) , the net of the role of differences in individual characteristics and region of residence in Germany and the UK immigrants' risk of unemployment is more sensitive to the economic cycle than that of the natives. De la Rica and Polonyankina (2013) document increased competition for jobs among immigrants during the Great Recession in Spain.
Relative to the natives, immigrants moved into jobs more intensive in manual skills during the recession years. Kahanec and Zimmermann (2016) provide an account of the effects of postenlargement labor mobility on receiving and sending EU member states. They document various adjustment channels at the EU-wide and national levels, through which postenlargement mobility helped to cushion some of the economic shocks during the Great Recession.
In a theoretical model, Borjas (2001) argues that such relative responsiveness of immigrants to wage differentials can be explained by the fact that for immigrants, the costs of parting with their homes and jobs are sunk upon arrival to the destination country. For the natives, however, such costs still affect their migration decision. Lower costs of immigrants' mobility should then result in a higher responsiveness of immigrants to economic opportunities vis-à-vis the natives. Several authors confirm this result empirically. Røed and Schøne (2012) show that the mobility of immigrants between regions in Norway is more responsive to the differences in average wage levels and unemployment rates. Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2010) find that the mobility of immigrants in Spain is more responsive to regional employment opportunities than the mobility of similarly skilled natives. Borjas (2001) and Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2012) empirically confirm that in the US and UK, respectively, immigrants respond to wage differentials across sectors, and occupations more fluidly than the natives. Guzi, Kahanec and Kurekova (2015) document this result for the In this paper we contribute to this literature by studying whether and how various immigrant groups in the EU-15 responded to asymmetric economic shocks across sectors, occupations and states before and during the Great Recession. Specifically, we measure the responsiveness to labor shortages of immigrants relative to natives building on the approach of Borjas (2001) , Dustmann et al. (2012) and Guzi et al. (2014 Guzi et al. ( , 2015 ; and extend this framework to gauge the evolution of immigrants' relative responsiveness over the business cycle. We primarily use data from the EU Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS) and the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC). The Member States that joined the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013 are not included among the receiving countries in the analysis due to the relatively limited inflow of immigrants into these countries and the resulting small sample sizes (Kahanec and Zaiceva, 2009 ).
The study is structured as follows. First, we introduce a theoretical framework to formalize the location decisions by natives and immigrants. Second, we provide a measure of labor shortages, and describe the estimation strategy to identify the aggregate responsiveness of immigrants from different origins in labor shortages, as compared to natives over the business cycle during the Great Recession. Finally, we discuss and interpret the results and the ensuing policy implications.
Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework of this paper is based on the model first presented by Borjas (2001) . The basic intuition underlying the model is that native workers face high costs of parting with their initial location, networks, and economic and social relationships. The existing wage differentials between countries are not sufficient to motivate large numbers of workers to move. In contrast, immigrants, having arrived at their destination only relatively recently, do not face such costs. For them, these costs of migration are sunk and do not fetter their migration decision. As a result, the location decisions of immigrant workers should be more responsive to wage differentials than those of natives.
The model assumes that natives and immigrants are allocated across states ( ) and occupation-industry groups ( ). Let denote the wage of worker ∈ in country ∈ .
We assume that is net of any adjustment costs, such as re-qualification costs, which are fixed and equal for all workers in a given country and occupation-industry group. A worker moves to a new country or to a new occupation-industry group from their original country ( 0 ) and occupation-industry group ( 0 ) if
where stands for the costs of moving between countries, occupations and industries, and, more specifically, it is assumed to include all pecuniary and non-pecuniary (psychological) costs of leaving behind the country, occupation, and industry of origin. It is reasonable to think that for natives, moving costs can be substantial, and so moves occur only when the incentives (e.g. wage differential) are large. In contrast, for immigrants these costs are sunk upon arrival and thus assumed to be zero. 2 Following this argument, new immigrants can be expected to be the most responsive to wage differentials among all other immigrant groups, who are in turn likely to be less fettered by D than the natives. The more time passes from initial immigration, the more similar the migration decisions of immigrants become compared to those of natives, due to the gradually increasing attachment to the location and employment.
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It is clear that as long as > 0, the cost induces friction into labor market adjustment, as there can be situations where wage differentials persist across countries and occupationindustry groups without inducing relocation. This can lead to inefficiencies in the allocation of workers across industries and occupations groups. In principle, capital flows could lead to the equalization of wage differentials, but with substantial lags and adjustment costs.
Measuring labor shortages and immigrant-native relative supply
The empirical strategy is adapted from Borjas (2001) , Dustmann et al. (2012) , and Guzi et al. (2014 Guzi et al. ( , 2015 . The two key variables in the model are labor shortage and relative labor supply of immigrants and natives across countries and occupation-industry groups. Similarly to Borjas (2001) , we estimate labor shortages at the level of occupation-industry-country cells as the part of wages that remains unexplained after differences in the composition of workers across cells are netted out. Specifically, for each year t we run a log-wage regression of this
where is the log wage of worker i who belongs to occupation-industry group k in country c, is a vector of individual characteristics including gender, education, work experience and work experience squared, and is the error term. 4 We normalize wage and all variables in vector to have zero means. The vector can be then interpreted as the (adjusted) percent wage differential between the average wage of individuals in the particular occupation-industry-country cell and the mean wage for a given year in the EU-15. We use as an indicator of labor shortage to measure immigrants' responses to changes in residual wage premia, vis-à-vis the natives' response.
The second key variable in the analysis is the measure of relative supply of immigrants and natives in each occupation-industry-country cell. The index is expressed by the ratio of immigrants belonging to a given occupation-industry group in a given country and year, and the total number of immigrants in the EU-15, relative to a similarly defined relative supply of natives in the cell and year. Formally
where is the number of immigrants belonging to occupation-industry group k, and country c in year t. The total number of immigrants in the EU-15 in year t is denoted as .
The denominator similarly indicates the relative supply of natives ⁄ in the particular cell and year. The index equals 1 when immigrants and native have the same distribution across occupation-industry groups and countries. The index is greater than 1 if immigrants in a given occupation-industry-country cell were overrepresented relative to the natives, and it equals 0 if no immigrants are present in a particular occupation-industry-country cell. In the empirical analysis, we use an index calculated for workers with and without tertiary education, and for different immigrant groups distinguished by their origin or time since immigration.
The baseline specification
To measure the relative responsiveness of immigrants to changing shortages in the labor market, we adopt a first-difference regression model as follows:
where ∆ , our measure of labor shortage, is lagged by one year. This is because the reaction of workers to changes in the labor market is likely to be delayed. The dependent variable is the relative supply of immigrants . The model also includes occupationindustry cell, country and year fixed effects ( , and ), which act as controls for any specific factors that might affect the relative supply of immigrants. Additionally, the model includes lagged values of country-level unemployment rate and GDP growth to account for variation in economic conditions between countries and over time. We estimate this model using the Ordinary Least Squares method with robust (Eicker-Huber-White) heteroskedasticconsistent standard errors and every observation is weighted by the total number of individuals in the cell. 5 It is worth noting that we do not adjust for differences in living costs in the construction of in Equation 2; that is done in the regression model of Equation 4 through the inclusion of country-year fixed effects.
A word of caution is due here: our measure of labor shortage captures any increase in the price of labor that cannot be explained by the changing composition of workers in terms of gender, education, and work experience in the given occupation-industry-country cell.
Whereas first differences, country and year fixed effects control for a range of additional factors specific to these categories, there may still be changes in residual wages that need not reflect increased shortage of labor in the given group or country, but are rather due to changing wage bargaining, regulation, or other factors that change the price of labor beyond the variation captured by the compositional and fixed effects. Whereas this potentially introduces measurement error in the link between measured and actual labor shortages, it does not affect our key argument, measuring immigrants' and natives' relative responsiveness to changing residual wages (whether due to shortages or other factors).
Another obvious issue in this type of models is that any measure of wages, such as , may be endogenous with respect to any measure of the labor force in the given labor market, such as . We acknowledge this issue, and note that as immigrants constitute a relatively small share in most labor markets and is a measure of composition and not size of labor supply in the given labor market (industry-occupation-country cell), the possible endogeneity of may be less problematic than in other models linking wages and labor supply. Moreover, we lag by one year, as is common in the literature (e.g. Borjas, 2001; Dustmann, et al. 2012; and Guzi et al., 2015) . Finally it is possible that immigrants increase the relative supply of labor in a given skill group, which should cause wages to decrease for that group and therefore the estimated coefficients can be interpreted as a lower bound.
Data and sample characteristics
The empirical part of this study draws from representative samples of households in fifteen In a similar fashion, we demonstrate the differences in job search behavior, unemployment duration and mobility across economic sectors. Figure 3 compares the share of workers in the immigrant and native workforce who seek other employment when they already have a job.
The relatively high rates of on-the-job searches among immigrants vis-à-vis the natives may point at lower attachment to their current job but also to an increased risk of involuntary jobto-job transitions or unemployment. In particular, immigrants from Africa and America significantly increased their search intensity during 2006-7, while in parallel they exhibited higher incidence of unemployment in the following years (see Figure 2 ). We generally observe increasing differences across various immigrant groups and the natives in their search behavior over the studied period. In the core analysis below, we estimate the sensitivity of relative labor supply of immigrants to wage differentials across occupation-industry-country groups. For each of the EU-15 countries we partition the labor force into occupation-industry-country cells defined by four occupation levels, based on the ISCO classification (see Appendix, Table A1 ), and nine industry groups based on the NACE classification (see Appendix, Table A2 ). This categorization generates 36 occupation-industry groups, for each of which, we calculated the Tables 1 and 2 illustrate the distribution of immigrants across occupation and industry groups.
Interestingly, the occupational structure of EU-15 immigrants is almost identical to that of the native workers, while the other immigrant groups are over-represented in occupations requiring lower qualification. One striking observation is that immigrant workers with tertiary education from the EU-12 and Europe (outside the EU) are substantially more frequently employed in lower ranked occupations (intermediate specific or low group) relative to not only the natives but also to all the other immigrant groups. This points to a high degree of over-qualification. This may be due to their relatively recent arrival in the receiving countries, but may also signify patterns of temporary migration whereby down-skilling (and saving on the costs of acquiring country-specific human capital) may be an optimal strategy for a temporary immigrants (Kahanec and Shields, 2013) . The distributional patterns observed for immigrants from Africa and America are very similar, especially for workers with tertiary education. In contrast, Asian immigrants are more successful and especially Asian workers without tertiary education are more often taking employment in occupations requiring higher qualifications than all the other immigrant groups except the EU-15. Overall, the descriptive evidence points to a favorable position of EU-15 immigrants in the European labor market. The working conditions of this group are highly comparable to the native-born workforce. In the core analysis below, the group of natives and EU-15 immigrants represent a comparison group to which the performance of immigrant groups is compared.
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The evidence presented above documents that immigrants from the EU-12 are different from the other immigrant groups in several directions. They exhibit high attachment to the labor market but also high risk of unemployment. Unemployment spells for EU-12 immigrants are short, their job search intensity is high, and they are able to change employment across economic sectors in the economy. Together with immigrants from Europe, EU-12 immigrants are most concentrated in elementary occupations and exhibit the highest degree of downskilling. This would be consistent with the hypothesis that being fresh in the receiving countries enables them to be a more fluid type of workers, seeking and responding to changing economic opportunities vigorously. The responsiveness of the other immigrant groups is likely to be restrained by institutional barriers, as many of such immigrants do not enjoy all the provisions of free intra-EU mobility of workers.
Results

The baseline model
Using the data and methodology outlined above, we test the responsiveness of immigrants from various origins, skills, and length of stay to labor shortages across sectors, occupations and states in the EU-15 host labor markets over the business cycle during the Great
Recession. In all models, we treat EU-15 countries as one entity, and study the relative responsiveness of immigrants to labor shortages vis-à-vis the EU native group (i.e. EU15
natives, including those living in their EU-15 member state of origin, as well as those living in another EU-15 member state).
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The results obtained on the pooled sample are presented in Table 3 wages in each occupation-industry-country cell, so that ε=β/Z. As the mean value of Z is 1.70 and 1.77 for EU-12 and Europe immigrants respectively, the estimates in Table 3 implies an elasticity of supply of 0.24 and 0.21 relative to EU native. 10 This elasticity gives the percentage change in the relative number of immigrants who choose to reside in a particular occupation-industry-country cell for a given percentage change in the wage.
Our findings also corroborate the notion developed in the theoretical section of this paper, that fresh immigrants are expected to be more responsive to the changing economic environment than those who moved longer ago. The higher responsiveness to labor shortage is identified for immigrants who reside six to ten years, and the effect is not significant for immigrants who arrived longer ago, or the fresh immigrants with up to five years since immigration.
In the next step, models are run with the relative supply of immigrants calculated for workers with and without tertiary education, and results are reported in the bottom panels of Table 3 .
Our estimates confirm that the higher responsiveness of immigrants from EU-12 countries to labor shortages, relative to the EU natives, is driven by low-educated workers (the same conclusion holds also for immigrants from outside EU, the estimate is marginally significant (p-value =0.107)). An interesting pattern emerges in the results by time since immigration.
Among low-educated workers, the effect is significant for a group of immigrants with some, but not too long, experience in the host country (6-10 years). On the other hand, in the group of high-educated workers, it is fresh (1-5 years) and established immigrants (10+ years), who are more responsive to labor market opportunities than EU natives. This could mean that recent high-educated immigrants are very responsive to labor shortages due to their costs of migration D being sunk, but also they may be better equipped to overcome any institutional barriers to their mobility than their low-educated counterparts. The estimated effects of labor shortage for other immigrants are statistically not different from zero, meaning that those groups respond to labor shortages similarly to the corresponding EU natives. Particularly the mobility of recent low-educated immigrants may be constrained by institutional barriers linked to their inexperience and short history in the country. Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC, EU-LFS, and WDI data.
Notes:
The dependent variable is the supply of immigrants relative to EU native in the particular occupation-industry-country cell expressed in first difference. The labor shortage for the same cell is also expressed in first difference and lagged. All models include lagged GDP per capita and unemployment rate (not reported in table) and cell, year and country fixed effects. YSM indicates the group of immigrants by years since immigration. The number of observations in the model varies because we allow only occupation-industry-country cells of sufficient size in all years. Regressions are weighted by the number of observations for the industry-country cell. Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses, *,**,*** identifying significance at 10, 5, 1 per cent levels, respectively.
The changes in the relative responsiveness of immigrants over time
In the previous, we show that EU-12 and Europe immigrants are more responsive than EU natives to labor imbalances while the responsiveness of other immigrants is not different from EU natives. In this section we study whether immigrants' responsiveness was changing over the business cycle during the Great Recession with the following empirical strategy: we estimate Equation 4 on six consecutive subsamples, each for a six year interval. 11 Our results presented in Table 4 imply that EU-12 immigrants responded to labor shortages more fluidly in samples containing more recession years. The opposite pattern emerges for the European immigrant group, where our estimates suggest higher responsiveness vis-à-vis the EU natives in the years before the Great Recession. The responsiveness of other immigrant groups to labor shortage shows less definite patterns: the responsiveness to labor shortages vis-à-vis the EU natives for the African group is significant in the sample, only consisting of recession years, Asians' responsiveness peaks around the inception of the Great Recession, and Americans' responsiveness is statistically indistinguishable from that of the EU-natives throughout the studied periods.
With respect to time since immigration, the estimates for fresh immigrants (1-5 years) are higher in the later periods but the effect does not become statistically significant. The estimate of the coefficients on labor shortage for the immigrant group with the arrival of 6-10 years ago follows a hump shape with the peak around the inception of the Great Recession. The estimate for established immigrants (longer than 10 years) is strongest before the Great
Recession and decreases to near-zero in later periods.
Finally, to understand how the responsiveness to labor shortages varies according to the qualification of a worker, we replicated the estimation in Table 4 for workers with and without tertiary education and presented estimates in Table A3 
Conclusions
The migration literature documents important contributions of the mobile immigrant workforce in the labor adjustment process (Borjas, 2001; Dustmann et al. 2012,; and Guzi et al. 2014; 2015) . Our analysis extends this literature to study immigrant groups by origin, time since immigration, and qualification level over the business cycle during the Great Recession.
Using primarily the EU LFS and EU SILC datasets, we find that immigrants are in general, not less, and in many cases, are more responsive to labor market shortages than the natives.
For the pooled sample comprising the whole studied period of 2004-2014, we find that lowskilled immigrants from the EU-12, and high-skilled ones form Africa exhibit higher responsiveness to labor shortages than the natives.
We also find that low-skilled immigrants responsiveness to labor shortages peaks for those with 6-10 years since immigration, possibly as a compound effect of their (still) low attachment to their specific location in the host labor market (and hence relatively low migration costs D), but an already sufficient adjustment to the conditions, and hence, ability to overcome barriers to migration in the host labor market. For high-skilled immigrants, the picture is the opposite, with the most recent immigrants (1-5 years) and the most established ones (11+ years) being most responsive. It is a topic for further study to evaluate the relative roles of migration costs (low for recent immigrants) and adjustment and ability to overcome barriers to migration (higher for more established immigrants).
In the analysis of immigrants' relative responsiveness to labor shortages over the business cycle during the Great Recession, where we follow the labor market using moving six-year windows, we find varying patterns for different immigrant groups. Immigrants from the new member states (EU-12) exhibited high responsiveness to labor shortages vis-à-vis the EU natives, which peaked and became significant during the Great Recession. The effect is however concentrated in the low-skilled segment of labor market. Results for immigrants from the rest of Europe (outside the EU) imply their relative responsiveness is positive and statistically significant only in the periods covering mostly pre-crisis years. Again, the effect is stronger when measured among low-skilled workers. The high-skilled African and Our findings are consistent with the findings for the pooled high-and low-skilled sample, that recent immigrants respond to labor shortages more fluidly than the natives (positive effects for EU-12 and high-educated fresh immigrants), but some groups achieve higher mobility only after some adjustment period needed to overcome institutional and legal barriers to occupational, inter-sectoral and spatial mobility (the effect for low-educated immigrant with six to ten years since immigration). For established immigrants (YSM 11+) responsiveness to labor shortages is higher in the period before the Great Recession, during which, the effect is reduced; however, the effect for the high-skilled ones in this category peaks around the onset of the Great Recession.
To summarize, we show that immigrants in general and specific groups of immigrants in particular have responded to changing labor shortages across EU member states, occupations and sectors at least as much and often more fluidly than the natives. This is especially true for immigrants from the new member states, but also fresh and not yet established immigrants.
The high-educated workers from African and American origins exhibit particularly high responsiveness to labor shortages during the Great Recession. These results may suggest the existence of two competing opposite effects on immigrants' responsiveness to labor shortages. First, fresh immigrants are more fluid as for them the costs of parting with their origins are sunk. Second, responsiveness to labor shortages is higher for immigrants who have accumulated some experience in the host labor markets, and thus, have learned how to overcome the barriers to labor mobility, or for those whose mobility is not restricted within the European Single Market. This may be one explanation why the two most mobile groups responding to labor shortages during the Great Recession are the relatively recent EU-12 immigrants and those not yet established but also with some experience. The role of the tightening migration policy and growing negative attitudes towards immigrants during the Great Recession needs to be further studied, to hopefully provide some answers why the responsiveness of European immigrants from outside the EU and those with eleven or more years since immigration dropped during the Great Recession. Table 4 and here for comparison. *,**,*** identify significance at 10, 5, 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
